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1Through the Looking Glass:  
What a Comparison with the New Polish Legal Framework of Arbitration Reveals About the 
U.S. Legal Framework of Arbitration 
Abstract 
 
In Poland, domestic and international arbitrations are regulated by the Civil Procedure 
Code.  A completely new set of regulations concerning arbitration went into effect in October, 
2005.   
A comparison of the Polish and American legal frameworks of arbitration reveals many 
similarities and a few key differences.  The differences involve the powers of arbitrators to 
decide upon their own jurisdiction, the arbitrability of employment disputes and the 
consequences of failure to consider applicable national law.   
Comparing how similar cases would be resolved under the new Polish standards and U.S. 
standards raises the question of how U.S. standards evolved and whether they are truly the most 
desirable and practical.  Ultimately, the author concludes that Congress should ammend the 
Federal Arbitration Act to eliminate certain troublesome ambiguities. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Public laws provide frameworks for the enforceability of arbitration agreements, the 
enforcement of arbitral awards and the setting aside of arbitral awards.  The public laws 
governing arbitration have attracted scrutiny and debate largely because of the tension between, 
on the one hand, the desirability of arbitration as an efficient and discrete vehicle for dispute 
resolution and, on the other, concerns that arbitration may compromise the enforcement of 
 
1 To explain the title of this paper: in the U.S., describing something as Polish does not always have a positive 
connotation.  This exercise in comparative law is intended to highlight how, despite U.S. prejudices, in the context 
of their legal frameworks of arbitration, the new Polish regulations are in some ways more logical than U.S. 
jurisprudence.  The phrase “Through the looking glass” is obviously borrowed from Lewis Carroll.  Upon reading 
this article, the reader will appreciate how the metaphor of Alice encountering seemingly illogical absurdities in 
Wonderland is more aptly applied to practitioners dealing with U.S. jurisprudence than the Polish framework 
governing arbitration.  In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, “a page of history is worth a thousand of logic” for 
the purposes of understanding seemingly illogical outcomes in common law jurisdictions.  Be that as it may, this 
article is part of a growing chorus suggesting that it is time for Congress to take action to reform the Federal 
Arbitration Act and mitigate some egregious idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies through legislative reform.  The title 
of this paper was chosen before realizing that this is a continuation of a distinguished tradition of co-opting the 
looking glass metaphor for use in the titles of scholarly legal works.  See, e.g. J.H.H. Weiler, Ulrich R. Haltern, The 
Autonomy of the Community Legal Order—Through the Looking Glass, 37 Harv. Int'l L.J. 411 (1996).   
2 J.D., Boston College; M.B.A., Boston College.  The author would like to thank Dr. Andrzej Tynel, a partner at the 
Warsaw, Poland office of Baker & McKenzie, for his assistance in understanding the precise meaning and 
implications of recent changes to Polish law. 
4mandatory statutory protections and due process rights.  Arbitral procedures, it is argued, can 
lack transparency, public accountability and procedural safeguards and may place non-lawyers in 
the position of having to accurately interpret statutes that serve important public policy 
objectives. 
 Comparing U.S. laws to those of another country can result in the realization that U.S. 
standards are in some instances not perfectly consistent, logical or desirable.  The standards of 
U.S. courts, sometimes criticized for being too permissive of arbitral dispute resolution when it 
may compromise procedural due process or substantive rights, sometimes turn out not to be the 
most encouraging of arbitration in all situations.  In other situations, U.S. jurisprudence indeed 
appears to be unreasonably favorable of enforcing arbitral outcomes.   
 This paper will begin with a review of the basic framework of U.S. arbitration law.  Next, 
this paper will highlight the most significant reforms to the Polish legal framework of arbitration.  
The most significant differences between the U.S. and Polish frameworks will then be explored.  
This comparison will reveal that U.S. law is in some ways not the most conducive to arbitration.  
This paper will also point out how U.S. law is, in other contexts, not the most desirable from a 
public policy perspective.  Ultimately, some of the inconsistencies and uncertainty surrounding 
the U.S. legal framework of arbitration are attributable to the nature of the common law legal 
tradition and the U.S. structure of federalism.  One possible solution to the shortcomings 
discussed in this paper would be Congressional action to reform the Federal Arbitration Act. 
 
II. The U.S. Legal Framework of Arbitration 
 
5Since 1925, the most important component of the U.S. framework of public laws 
governing arbitration has been the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).3 Congress enacted the FAA 
to “revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements”.4 The FAA provides that 
written agreements to arbitrate in the context of interstate and international commercial 
transactions shall be enforceable except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.5 The FAA allows courts to compel arbitration where there is a valid 
agreement to arbitrate but where one party refuses to arbitrate.6 The FAA also allows courts to 
confirm or enforce arbitral awards.7 The only grounds stated in the FAA for vacating an arbitral 
award are  fraud, partiality or corruption of an arbitrators, arbitrator misconduct or lack of 
jurisdiction.8
Chapter 2 of the FAA was added to implement the 1958 United Nations Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”).  
Chapter 3 of the FAA was added to implement the 1975 Inter-American Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration (the “Panama Convention”).  These Conventions require 
the courts of Contracting States to compel arbitration arising under a valid arbitration agreement 
and to enforce properly rendered foreign arbitral awards. 
 Although every state has its own act governing the enforceability of arbitral agreements 
and outcomes, the FAA was ruled to preempt state laws by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos., Inc. v. Dobson.9 There, an Alabama statute that prohibited the 
 
3 U.S. Arbitration Act, ch.213, §§ 1-5, 43 Stat. 883-86 (1925).  The original Act contained only the first chapter of 
the current statute. 
4 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974)). 
5 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
6 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). 
7 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000). 
8 9 U.S.C. § 10 & 11 (b) (2000). 
9 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
6enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements was held to be preempted by the FAA despite 
an amicus brief filed by twenty states attorney general.10 The court reasoned that Congress has 
the power to preempts state laws in this context based on the commerce clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.11 The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the FAA preempted a state statute 
that required arbitration provisions to be printed in underlined capital letters on the first page of 
contracts, even when the intent of the law was to ensure informed consent to arbitration 
provisions.12 Thus, for all intents and purposes, when evaluating the public law framework 
governing arbitration in the United States, it is appropriate to focus on the FAA and how the 
FAA has been interpreted by court decisions. 
 While the evolution of FAA jurisprudence in specific contexts will be explained in 
greater detail infra, it is worth noting from the onset that arbitration under the FAA has grown 
drastically beyond what its drafters intended, which was to assure only on procedural rights of 
contracting parties.13 The FAA has instead become a “national regulatory statute.”14 In the 
words of Justice O'Connor, “over the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of 
ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, 
case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”15 This view has also been expressed by scholars 
such as Susan Karamanian: “As a result of statutory mandate, or at times due to their own 
 
10 Id. at 272. 
11 Id. at 273-274. 
12 Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 (1996).  In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the 
Montana Supreme Court’s decision that a Montana Subway sandwich shop franchisee would not have to travel to 
the franchisor’s location in Connecticut because the form contract did not follow Montana’s specifications about the 
font size and location of arbitration provisions in a contract. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 933 (Mont. 
1994), rev’d 517 U.S. at 681 (1996).   
13 Tom Carbonneau, Cases and Materials on Commercial Arbitration, 20 (Adams & Reese Legal Services, 1997) at 
173 n.7 (quoting Maye v. Smith Barney, 897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
14 Jack Wilson, “No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses,” State-Law Unconscionability, and the Federal Arbitration 
Act: A Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action, 23 QLR 737, 849 (2004). 
15 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Perry v. 
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).   
7devices, U.S. courts have become imbedded in the international arbitration process. ...[T]he 
judicial landscape is far from clear.”16 
III. Polish Legal Framework of Arbitration  
 
In Poland, both domestic and international arbitrations are regulated by the Civil 
Procedure Code, enacted in 1964.  A completely new set of regulations concerning arbitration 
were passed on July 28, 2005, and have been in effect since October 2005.  The changes 
liberalized the legal framework of arbitration and were based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
The references below are to the new articles introduced into the Polish Kodeks Postepowania 
Cywilnego, or Civil Procedure Code. 
 Some new provisions clarified previously ambiguous issues, including when courts may 
nullify agreements to arbitrate.  For example, having the powers of attorney now clearly includes 
the power to enter into binding arbitration agreements (art. 1167).  In the present context of 
comparing current Polish standards with U.S. standards, it is particularly interesting that the 
Polish Civil Procedure Code voids contractual provisions that give unequal power to parties to an 
arbitration, including provisions that entitle only one party to opt for arbitration. 
Other changes relate to the arbitrability of disputes.  All asset-related disputes are now 
arbitrable except for those involving child support payments (art. 1157).  Disputes within 
corporations, cooperatives and associations are now arbitrable.   A company and its shareholders 
are now bound by arbitration clauses in the articles of association (art 1163 § 1) and disputes 
between Polish parties will be arbitrable in foreign arbitration courts.  However, in the context of 
 
16 Susan L. Karamanian, “The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond: International Commercial Arbitration and the 
United States Courts,” 34 Geo. Wash. Int’l. Rev. 17 (2002) 
8this paper, it is particularly interesting to note that labor and employment disputes are now 
arbitrable, but only if a written agreement to arbitrate is entered into after the dispute begins (art. 
1164). 
 Several new provisions involve arbitral jurisdiction and procedures.  Parties now have 
complete freedom to determine the composition of arbitral tribunals and select arbitrators.   
Parties also now have complete freedom to determine rules and procedures, as long as parties are 
treated equitably in the procedures (art. 1183).  Also, retired state judges are now allowed to 
serve as arbitrators (art. 1170 § 2).  In the context of this paper, it is especially noteworthy that 
the new provisions adopt the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz; namely, an arbitral tribunal is 
able to decide whether it has jurisdiction over a matter and whether an arbitration agreement is 
valid (art. 1180 § 1).  Consistent with the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, validity or expiry of 
an agreement that includes an arbitration clause will not necessarily mean that an arbitration 
agreement is invalid or expires (art. 1180 § 1). 
The new provisions also address applicable law and setting aside awards.  Arbitrators can 
adjudicate disputes according to applicable law and in accordance with the agreement between 
the parties and established customs.  If so empowered by the parties, arbitrators may rule 
according to general legal or moral principles (art. 1194).  The possible grounds for setting aside 
an arbitral award closely resemble the provisions of Article V of the New York Convention of 
1958.  The only means of challenging an arbitral ruling in Poland will be to have the ruling 
overturned in court.  An award will be set aside only if there was no valid arbitration clause, 
procedural unfairness such that a party was unable to present its case, if the arbitral award was 
overruled by a court, if Polish law prohibits the arbitration of the subject matter, or if the award 
9violates fundamental principles of justice (art. 1205 and subsequent articles).  Parties have three 
months from the date of the arbitral decision to appeal the ruling in court (art. 1208). 
 Finally, the new provisions streamline the acknowledgement and enforcement of arbitral 
awards.  Until now the proceedings have included two stages, which increased the time required 
to obtain an enforceability judgment.  The new rules outline two distinct procedures.  In the first, 
a party may be seeking simply an acknowledgement, such as a confirmation of the arbitrator’s 
decision as to the meaning of a contract’s term.  In the second, a party may be seeking 
enforcement, such as recovering monetary damages.  In either case, a party must bring the matter 
to a court.  In the first case, the court may acknowledge the arbitral determination, issuing the 
decision in a closed session.  In the second case, the court issues an executory order (art. 1214). 
 A separate article controls the acknowledgement or enforcement of rulings and 
settlements by foreign arbitrators.  In such cases, a party must still go to a court to have an award 
acknowledged or enforced (art. 1215).  The grounds for refusing to recognize or enforce an 
award are essentially the same as in domestic cases (art. 1205).  Namely, a court may refuse to 
recognize or enforce a foreign arbitral award on the grounds that there was no valid agreement to 
arbitrate, procedural unfairness, that the award was overturned by a court in a relevant foreign 
jurisdiction, that the subject of the arbitration is inarbitrable under Polish law or that the award 
violates fundamental principles of justice. 
 
IV. How U.S. and Polish Law Differ 
 
A. Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
 
10 
In the U.S., the question of whether an arbitral body has jurisdiction over a dispute is 
typically one for the courts to decide, per the FAA.  The alternative approach, prevalent in most 
of the world and prominent in most internationally-recognized rules of arbitration,17 is known as 
kompetenz-kompetenz.18 Stated simply, this principle gives arbitrators the power to decide their 
own jurisdiction.”19 The UNCITRAL model law endorses the principle of kompetenz-
kompetenz,20 allowing a limited period of expedited court review to appeal jurisdictional 
questions.  Poland has adopted the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, as proposed by the 
UNCITRAL model law, allowing an arbitral tribunal not only the power to decide questions of 
its own jurisdiction, but also to decide whether an arbitration agreement is valid and effective.  
Consistent with the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, the invalidity or expiry of a contract does 
not in itself cause the arbitration agreement to be invalid or expire. 
 In the U.S., the question of whether an arbitral tribunal has the power to decide questions 
regarding its own jurisdiction has become obfuscated recently by the Supreme Court’s decision 
 
17 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules of Arbitration state that “[t]he 
arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on objections that it has no jurisdiction, including any objections with 
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration clause or of the separate arbitration agreement.” UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules Art. 21. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration allow a court to 
determine whether an agreement to arbitrate exists; if so, all other decisions related to jurisdiction are for the arbitral 
tribunal to decide. ICC Rules of Arbitration Art. 6(2). The Arbitration Rules of the International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the American Arbitration Association (AAA) International 
Arbitration Rules likewise give arbitral tribunals the power to rule on their own jurisdiction, including objections 
with respect to the existence of the arbitration agreement. ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(1); AAA International 
Arbitration Rules Art. 15. The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules state that “[b]y agreeing to 
arbitration under these Rules, the parties shall be treated as having agreed not to apply to any state court or other 
judicial authority for any relief regarding the Arbitral Tribunal's jurisdiction or authority ....” LCIA Rules of 
Arbitration Art. 23.4. 
18 The doctrine originated in German courts, and hence, while the term competence-competence is sometimes used 
in the U.S., the doctrine is most frequently referred to by its German name.  Natasha Wyss, First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A Perilous Approach to Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 351 at fn 3 (1997) (citing 
to Frank-Bernd Weigand, The UNCITRAL Model Law: New Draft Arbitration Acts in Germany and Sweden, 11 
Arb. Int'l 398, 404 (1995)). 
19 China Minmetals Materials Import and Export Co., Ltd. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, C.A.3 (N.J.),2003. 
20 Howard M. Holtzmann and Joseph E. Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, Legislative History and Commentary 480 (1989). 
11 
in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.21 While the Court clarified that, in the U.S., the 
courts are to decide challenges to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals,22 it carved out an 
exception which has proven to be the source of confusion and inconsistency.  The exception 
arises when there is “clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties intended to submit the 
arbitrability issue to arbitration.23 In such a situation, a court must give “considerable leeway to 
the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow circumstances."24 
One could interpret the First Options exception to be nudging U.S. jurisprudence toward 
a position more consistent with kompetenz-kompetenz,25 but by (1) stating this as an exception to 
the U.S. default rule and (2) failing to reconcile this exception with the language FAA,26 the 
opinion has generated several critiques and inconsistent outcomes.27 The best evidence that the 
Supreme Court obfuscated the issue is the ensuing conflict among the Circuit Courts of Appeal.  
Conflicts between the circuits have emerged in the context of contracts in the securities industry, 
which include a six-year limit on the eligibility of disputes for arbitration.  Some circuits 
interpret this threshold issue of arbitrability to be a question for the courts in the absence of 
 
21 514 U.S. 938 (1995).  
22 Id. at at 947-49. 
23 Id. at 944. 
24 Id. at 943.  The Supreme Court followed up First Options with their opinion in Green Tree Financial v. Bazzle,
where it found that, in the consumer loan context, arbitrators should be allowed exclusive authority to decide 
whether claimants can procede collectively when their arbitration agreements are silent on the issue of class 
arbitration, potentially signalling that the movement toward allowing arbitrators more discretion over their 
jurisdiction is stronger than many imagined at the time of First Options.
25 Some have pointed out that there were some limited circumstances where previously U.S. courts would allow 
arbitrators to decide their own jurisdiction if so allowed by the arbitration rules adopted in the arbitration agreement.  
See Conrad K. Harper, The Options in First Options: International Arbitration and Arbitral Competence, 771 
PLI/Comm 127, 141-43 (1998). 
26 Id. at 938-49. 
27 Adriana Dulic, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan and the Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 2 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 
77, (2002); Natasha Wyss, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A Perilous Approach to Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 351 (1997); Shirin Philipp, Is the Supreme Court Bucking the Trend?  First Options v. 
Kaplan in Light of European Reform Initiatives in Arbitration Law, 14 B.U. Int'l L.J. 119 (1996). 
12 
evidence of contrary intentions of the parties.28 Other circuits have interpreted this six-year limit 
as a matter for arbitrators to decide, per the First Options opinion.29 
The most credible resolution to this problem is to eliminate the basis for inconsistency 
through legislative reform.  The FAA states that it is a court issue to resolve questions of arbitral 
jurisdiction, so it would be improper for even the Supreme Court to attempt to contradict the 
clear text of a constitutional law passed by Congress.  Therefore, Congress should pass 
legislation to reform the FAA and clearly state the situations where arbitral bodies may decide 
questions of their own jurisdiction, and when and how such controversies may be resolved by the 
courts. 
B. Arbitrability of employment disputes   
 As stated supra, employment disputes are only arbitrable in Poland if the agreement is 
entered into after the dispute arises.  In the U.S., a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate may be 
enforced in the context of employment law.  However, there are some important caveats to this 
general rule.  Most significantly, state contract law still provides a basis for nonenforcement of 
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate in the context of employment law, but the standard for 
defining such situations is ambiguous.  To fully understand how this ambiguity could arise, a 
brief review of the relevant jurisprudence is required. 
 
28 The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh circuits have held that a court must decide the applicability of a 
time limitation because they found that the bar is a substantive eligibility requirement.  See, e.g., Smith Barney Inc. 
v. Schell, 53 F3d 807 (7th Cir. 1995); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1992); PaineWebber 
Inc. v. Farnam, 870 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989). 
29 In contrast, the First, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits either deemed the time limits to be a procedural question for 
arbitrators to decide or else found clear and obvious intent on the part of the parties to be bound to the decisions of 
arbitrators as to such a decision.  See, e.g. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47. F. 3d 750 (5th Cir. 1995);  FSC 
Securities Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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It would appear that the text of the FAA does not ensure that pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in the context of employment law would be enforced.  Section One of the FAA 
excludes from the statute's coverage “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or 
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”30 There are many in the 
U.S. that believe that Congress did not intend the FAA to reach beyond disputes between 
businesspeople, arguing, for example that:  
 It is hard to imagine any office accountable to an electorate who would 
openly avow the purpose of enabling those with economic power to diminish the 
enforceability of rights conferred by Congress and state legislatures on 
consumers, patients, employees, investors, shippers, passengers, franchisees, and 
shopkeepers.31 
Courts have come to similar conclusions about employment law statutes: 
 [A]n employee who brings a claim against his employers... on behalf of 
the federal government should not be forced by unequal bargaining power to 
accept a forum demanded as a condition of employment by the very party on 
which he informed.32 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was among the courts construing Section One of the FAA to 
not require the arbitration of employment disputes.33 Until 2001, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
 
30 9 USC § 1 (2000). 
31 See Wilson, supra note 14 at 849.  For other authorities arguing that the FAA was intended to apply to merchants 
of roughly equal bargaining power, see, e.g. Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition of Arbitration by those with 
Superior Bargaining Power, Utah L. Rev. 857 (1999).  
32 Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 121 F.Supp.2d 643 (N.D.Ohio Nov 21, 2000) (on appeal, the Circuit Court held that, 
besides the question of whether the matter under a federal statute are arbitrable, a fundamental question existed as to 
whether there was even valid assent by the employee to the arbitration agreement and whether the agreement 
covered such a situation).  Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 312 F.3d 243, 246 (C.A.6, Ohio, 2002). 
33 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, C.A.9 (Cal.),1999. 
14 
Lane Corp.,34 was the Supreme Court case that came closest to providing guidance on this point.  
The Gilmer decision barred a lawsuit under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
thus requiring a registered securities representative to arbitrate his claim.  Since the agreement to 
arbitrate was in the securities registration document and not an employment contract, the 
Supreme Court stated that it need not interpret Section 1 of the FAA in the context of 
employment disputes at that time.  
 In the case of Circuit City v. Adams, the retailer sued in federal court in California to 
block a sales employee’s discrimination action in state court.35 Circuit City asked the federal 
court to require the employee to arbitrate his claims under the FAA.  Circuit City argued that the 
arbitration clause in their standardized employment contract should be enforced.36 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed the District Court’s order for arbitration on the grounds that all employment 
contracts were excluded from enforcement under the FAA, a position that was in conflict with all 
other circuits to have addressed the question, yet based on an understandable and credible 
reading of the FAA’s Section One.37 
The Supreme Court ruled that the exceptions in Section One of the FAA were intended to 
apply only to transportation workers, whose employment disputes were subject to regulation 
under other statutes such as the Railway Labor Act.38 The Court held that all other employment 
 
34 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
35 Id. 
36 The arbitration clause read: “I agree that I will settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or 
controversies arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for employment, employment and/or 
cessation of employment with Circuit City, exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator. 
By way of example only, such claims include claims under federal, state, and local statutory or common law, such as 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including the 
amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the law of contract and the law of 
tort.”  
37 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
38 Id. at 121. 
15 
contracts are subject to Section 2 of the FAA, which permits federal courts to enforce arbitration 
agreements in any “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” 
 However, the Circuit City decision is silent on vital questions, such as the consequences 
of the failure of arbitration agreements to meet the requirements of an enforceable contract or if 
arbitral procedures are not as protective of statutory rights as the rules of civil procedure in the 
courts. 
 Therefore, courts are still free to find that an agreement to arbitrate is unconscionable.  
The Third Circuit came to such a conclusion in Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Services VI, Inc.39 In 
this case, Parilla, a dismissed employee, sued her former employer for violations of Title VII and 
Titles 10 and 24 of the Virgin Islands Code, wrongful discharge, breach of contract, 
misrepresentation, negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress.  In response to 
IAP’s motion to compel arbitration, the District Court adopted its previous reasoning in Plaskett 
v. Bechtel International, Inc.40 On appeal, the Third Circuit adopted its own previous logic, 
expressed in Alexander v. Anthony Int'l L.P.;41 namely, that if such employment contracts are 
enforceable to the same extent as any other contracts, then unconscionable employment contracts 
cannot be enforced.42 
The Parilla case is especially instructional, because it reveals the complexity and 
uncertainty of decisions regarding the conscionability of arbitration clauses in employment 
contracts.  The Third Circuit ruled on six questions pertaining to the conscionability of the 
arbitration clause.  First, the Court decided that a thirty-day notice provision, requiring the 
presentation of a written complaint to the company within 30 days of a dispute, to be 
 
39 368 F.3d 269 (3d Cir 2004). 
40 243 F.Supp. 2d 334 (D.Vi. 2003) 
41 341 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2003) 
42 368 F.3d at 275-6. 
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unconscionable.43 Second, the Court ruled that requiring each side to “bear its own costs and 
expenses, including attorney's fees” to be unconscionable.44 The Third Circuit, however, 
disagreed with the District Court and deemed a confidentiality provision conscionable.  Both the 
Circuit and the District Court agreed that the provision requiring disputes to be arbitrated rather 
than resolved in court or through an administrative agency was conscionable.45 Both the District 
Court and Third Circuit deemed that a provision prohibiting the selection of a resident of the 
Virgin Islands as arbitrator was conscionable.46 
Finally, the Third Circuit remanded to the District Court on the question of whether to 
sever the unenforceable provisions from the rest of the agreement to arbitrate or to wholly 
invalidate the entire agreement: 
 The existence of multiple unconscionable provisions will not always 
evidence ‘serious moral turpitude’ or serious misconduct, precluding enforcement 
of the agreement to arbitrate.  That will depend on whether the number of such 
provisions and the degree of the unfair support the inference that the employer 
was not seeking a bona fide mechanism for dispute resolution, but rather sought to 
impose a scheme that it knew or should have known would provide it with an 
impermissible advantage.47 
The case of Hooters v. Philips is the typical textbook case for such a scenario.48 There, the 
Fourth Circuit stated that the agreement to arbitrate included so many unfair arbitral procedures 
that it rendered the entire agreement to arbitrate unenforceable.   
 
43 Id. at 277-8. 
44 Id. at 278-9. 
45 Id. at 282. 
46 Id. at 283.   
47 Id. at 289. 
48 Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, C.A.4 (S.C.),1999. 
17 
Here we see the huge opportunity for inconsistency in the U.S. approach to pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in the employment law context.  Judging the unconscionability of 
arbitration procedures requires applying contract law.  Each of fifty state jurisdictions has its 
own body of contract case law.  This fact may result in some inconsistency between jurisdictions 
as to what qualifies as conscionable, especially when one takes into account the individual 
sympathies of various judges.  Indeed, some inconsistencies have emerged between the circuits 
already.  For example, in some jurisdictions, an employment agreement that limits the available 
damages may not be enforced,49 while in others, it will be.50 
C. Remedies for agreements that are unconscionable  
 
As explained supra, the Polish Code of Civil Procedure makes void any contractual 
provisions that allocate unequal powers, including those that allow only one party the choice of 
whether to arbitrate.  The U.S. cases involving unconscionability as grounds for invalidating 
arbitration clauses supra in the employment law context and other varieties of cases involving 
unconscionability all cite to unfair procedural provisions.51 Thus, it is noteworthy that Polish 
and U.S. law are roughly comparable when it comes to finding grounds to invalidate unfair 
arbitral procedure provisions or entire arbitration agreements.  The key difference, as noted in the 
previous section, is that the ambiguity and inconsistency that characterize the issue of arbitrating 
employment disputes in the U.S. is eliminated in Poland by the new Code of Civil Procedure 
regulations. 
 
49 Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, 134 F.3d 1054, (11th Cir.(Fla.) Feb 04, 1998). 
50 Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir.(N.C.) Jan 22, 2001). 
51 For a discussion of U.S. cases using unconscionability to invalidate provisions in agreements to arbitrate, see 
Mary Jane Groff, Where Can Unconscionability Take Arbitration?  Why the Fifth Circuit’s Conscience Was Only 
Partially Shocked, J. Disp. Resol. 131 (2005). 
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D. Consequences of a foreign tribunal’s failure to consider applicable national law 
 
As mentioned supra, Polish law does not state that courts may set aside an arbitral award 
for failing to consider Polish national law.  In contrast, one of the persistent mysteries of U.S. 
law is the “second look” doctrine established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors  v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth.52 The Mitsubishi case involved an auto distributor who wanted to sue 
Mitsubishi under antitrust laws in court despite a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate.  The 
Supreme Court was convinced that a Japanese arbitrator under Swiss choice-of-law rules would 
apply U.S. antitrust laws.  In its famous footnote 19 to the opinion, the Mitsubishi court 
addressed the  concern that citizens may be deprived of important protections of U.S. statutes.53 
Footnote 19 states that where choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses operate together as a 
prospective waiver of statutory rights, the agreement would be struck down on public policy 
grounds.  Further, footnote 19 states that if a foreign arbitral forum ever failed to apply U.S. law 
in a situation where it was so appropriate, U.S. courts could review the arbitral decision at the 
enforcement stage and refuse to enforce the arbitral outcome on the grounds that appropriate and 
applicable U.S. law was not considered.  This ability to review the arbitral decision at the 
enforcement stage is the “second look” that has stirred so much controversy over the past two 
decades.  
 The second look doctrine is an enduring mystery because, while scholars have spilt much 
ink in analyzing it54 and while courts have relied on it to greatly expand their deference to 
 
52 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985). 
53 Id. 
54 Dulic, supra note 27;  Wilson, supra note 14; Lisa Sopata, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc.: International Arbitration and Antitrust Claims, 7 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 595 (1986). 
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arbitral tribunals,55 there has not been a single instance where a U.S. court has used its “second 
look powers” to recognize – or to refuse to recognize – a foreign arbitral award.  The second 
look doctrine is also controversial in that it does not appear to completely please either pro-
arbitration advocates or individuals who are staunchly suspicious of secretive foreign forums 
applying U.S. public laws.  On the one hand, the Mitsubishi decision opened the door for a wide 
variety of statutes involving public policy to be interpreted and applied by private arbitral 
forums.  In this sense, the Mitsubishi decision is rightfully seen as conducive to private dispute 
resolution.  On the other hand, Mitsubishi’s footnote 19 appears to have created a ground for 
non-recognition that does not appear in the New York Convention: namely, that aside from 
fundamental notions of fairness and justice, just the very fact that national law was not 
considered can serve as grounds for non-recognition. 
 While footnote 19 of the Mitsubishi decision and the second look doctrine have been 
relegated to the status of dicta over the past two decades,56 the Mitsubishi decision’s second look 
doctrine has never been overruled or disavowed by the Supreme Court.  Therefore, it is worth 
noting that, in this regard, U.S. jurisprudence still retains a feature which is less conducive of 
arbitral outcomes than Polish law.  The Mitsubishi decision still raises questions as the finality of 
international arbitral awards that may require enforcement in the U.S.   
 
V. Concluding Observations 
 
55 See, e.g., Vimar Seguros v Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995); Richad’s v. Lloyd’s of London, 
135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 943  (Oct. 13, 1998); George Fischer Foundry Systems, Inc. v. 
Adolph H. Hottinger Maschinenbau GmbH, 1994-1 CCH Trade Cases 70,566 (E.D. Mich. 1994), aff’d, 55 F.3d 1206 (6th Cir. 
1995); Simula v. Autoliv, 175 F.3d 716, 722 (9th Cir. 1999).
56 See, e.g., Vimar Seguros v Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995); Richad’s v. Lloyd’s of London, 
135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 943  (Oct. 13, 1998); George Fischer Foundry Systems, Inc. v. 
Adolph H. Hottinger Maschinenbau GmbH, 1994-1 CCH Trade Cases 70,566 (E.D. Mich. 1994), aff’d, 55 F.3d 1206 (6th Cir. 
1995); Simula v. Autoliv, 175 F.3d 716, 722 (9th Cir. 1999).
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The preceding comparison of the U.S. and Polish legal frameworks of arbitration reveals 
that, in some instances, Polish law is currently more favorable to arbitration than U.S. law, and 
highlights several oddities of U.S. law.  Polish arbitration law is more favorable of arbitration 
than U.S. law in that Polish arbitrators are explicitly allowed to decide whether they have 
jurisdiction and there is no basis for invalidating international awards for failure to apply Polish 
law when appropriate.  In other regards, the new Polish framework contains a safeguard that 
appeals to common sense, even as it appears to be absent from the jurisprudence of the United 
States.  Namely, pre-dispute arbitration agreements will not be enforced in the context of 
employment law. 
 Ultimately, this comparison of U.S. jurisprudence with Polish regulations also reveals the 
confusion and uncertainty that can characterize U.S. law.  Some differences between states and 
circuits are of course inevitable due to the U.S. structure of federalism and its common law 
tradition, but the confusion and ambiguity are especially in this context are exacerbated by less-
than-ideal legislative drafting.57 This is not the first paper to argue that Congress should reform 
the FAA to address well-founded concerns,58 nor is this paper likely to be the last.  Specifically, 
Congress ought to clarify whether indeed Congressional intent is that pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in employment contracts are to be enforced, that arbitrators have the ability to decide 
 
57 Susan L. Karamanian, supra note 16, see 19-95 (“To a certain extent, drafting in the [New York] Convention 
and/or in the Convention Act [which made the New York Convention’s provisions part of the FAA] has contributed 
to the varying judicial opinions.  Also, an apparent lack of awareness of the intricacies of the treaty and the 
legislative scheme is at fault.” Susan Karamanian goes on to point out that the implementing legislation of the New 
York Convention fails to define elementary terms from “agreement in writing” to “arbitral award.”  Karamanian 
provides examples of contradictory court decisions on, for example, the issue of whether unsigned documents that 
include an arbitration clause amount to an agreement in writing.  Karamanian also points out the uncertainty as to 
whether an arbitral command to produce a document such as a tax return is an interim order or an arbitral award that 
can be enforced by a court. 
58 Dulic, supra note 27;  Wilson, supra note 14; Lisa Sopata, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc.: International Arbitration and Antitrust Claims, 7 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 595 (1986). 
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challenges to their own jurisdiction, and that arbitral awards may be nonenforceable if applicable 
U.S. laws are not considered by arbitrators. 
